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This article uses original data from research at the Court
of Protection to explore capacity to consent to sex in
practice. It argues that the approach under the Men-
tal Capacity Act 2005 fails to place appropriate focus on
consent as central to understanding sexual capacity. The
capabilities approach to justice is then used to demon-
strate the limitations of the existing legal approach to
capacity to consent to sex, and to argue that the protec-
tive focus of the legal test would be better centred on
the social risks resulting from non-consensual sex and
exploitation. Finally, the article argues that, rather than
focusing on a medicalized approach to understanding
sexual intimacy, an analysis based on capabilities theory
provides conceptual tools to support arguments for addi-
tional resources to help disabled people to realize their
rights to sexual intimacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Sexuality and intimacy in the context of cognitive disability present a range of challenging social
and legal issues. Whereas in the past disabled people were routinely and actively prevented from
engaging in sexual activity,1 or sterilized without consent to avoid unwanted pregnancy,2 contem-
porary approaches to intimacy for disabled adults require a more nuanced approach. This article
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1 R. Sandland, ‘Sex and Capacity: The Management of Monsters?’ (2013) 76Modern Law Rev. 981.
2 Re F (Mental Patient Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
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focuses on how the Court of Protection (CoP) deals with capacity to consent to sex for disabled
people, particularly those with cognitive disabilities, dementia, and mental health difficulties.
Recent years have seen increasing attention to these issues within academic literature and CoP
practice.3 Disabled people’s rights to develop loving and sexual relationships, and to engage in
consensual intimacy, are protected by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities (CRPD). However, as Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn state, ‘[t]he right to sexual agency has not
perfectly found its place in human rights law’.4
English law allows for adults who are assessed to lack the mental capacity to consent to sex to
be prevented from engaging in sexual relations. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) applies to
thosewhose capacity is limited as a result of ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning
of, the mind or brain’.5 The MCA uses a functional test, which requires the person to understand,
retain, use, and weigh information relevant to the decision, including the reasonably foreseeable
consequences, and to communicate their decision.6 Through analysis of how sexuality and inti-
macy are dealt with inCoP practice, we argue that the dominant approach to capacity to consent to
sex fails to capture the essence of sexual activity as a social practice, andmore specifically the cen-
tral importance of understanding consent. Instead, we show that the CoPmedicalizes sex, despite
consent having been articulated to form part of the relevant information for assessing capacity
to consent to sex since at least 2012.7 We demonstrate, through original observational data and
case file analysis, that in practice, pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) remain at
the centre of a biologically focused, medicalized approach to capacity. Medicalization is the pro-
cess by which ‘natural’ life experiences or events are defined as a medical issue.8 We argue that
the medicalized approach allows the CoP to sidestep the social dimensions of sex, particularly a
person’s understanding that sex is a choice, and one to which either party can say no.
We build upon the conceptual framework provided by the capabilities approach to justice9 to
explore how the CoP engages with sexual intimacy in practice. The capabilities approach focuses
on improving human welfare and development and can be used to identify if individuals in soci-
ety are being treated justly and, as a result, how resources should be allocated. The function of the
mental capacity approach is to protect individuals who are unable to make decisions for them-
selves. The function of the capabilities approach is to provide individuals with an entitlement to
support to enable them to develop the capabilities needed for human flourishing. This distinc-
tion will be explored to show what difference a capabilities approach can add to understanding
3 See, for example, J. Herring, ‘Mental Disability and Capacity to Consent to Sex: A Local Authority v. H [2012] EWHC 49
(COP)’ (2012) 34 J. of Social Welfare and Family Law 471; B. Clough, ‘Vulnerability and Capacity to Consent to Sex: Asking
the Right Questions?’ (2014) 26 Child and Family Law Q. 371; J. Herring and J. Wall, ‘Capacity to Consent to Sex’ (2014)
22 Medical Law Rev. 620; L. Series, ‘Sex, Capacity and Forensic Cotton Wool: IM v. LM [2014] EWCA Civ 37’ (2014) 36 J.
of Social Welfare and Family Law 317; A. Arstein-Kerslake and E. Flynn, ‘Legislating Consent: Creating an Empowering
Definition of Consent to Sex that Is Inclusive of People with Cognitive Disabilities’ (2016) 25 Social & Legal Studies 225.
4 Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, id., p. 4.
5 MCA, s. 2(1).
6 MCA, s. 3.
7 See A Local Authority v. H [2012] EWHC 49; The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v. TB and SA [2014] EWCOP 53.
8 P. Conrad, The Medicalization of Society: On the Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders (2007).
9 A. Sen,Commodities andCapabilities (1985); A. Sen, InequalityReexamined (1992);A. Sen,Development asFreedom (1999);
A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009); M. C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2007);
M. C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (2013) 33; M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Women and
Equality: The Capabilities Approach’ (1999) 138 International Labor Rev. 227; M. C. Nussbaum,Women and Human Devel-
opment: The Capabilities Approach (2001).
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capacity beyond what has been achieved through other ways of analysing this area, such as
through the CRPD or vulnerability theory.10
The CoP deals with cases that arise under the MCA and hears a wide range of disputes, includ-
ing cases concerning consent tomedical treatment, decisions about property and financial affairs,
and general welfare cases. The cases that we focus on here relate to intimate relationships, includ-
ing caseswhere the subject of proceedings (referred to as ‘P’) is the victim of abuse and caseswhere
they are (potential) perpetrators. The role of the CoP under the MCA is to resolve disputes about
mental capacity and best interests, which includes making declarations that a person has or lacks
capacity under MCA, s. 15. In the case of capacity to consent to sex, the CoP cannot substitute a
decision on the individual’s behalf because of the operation of MCA, s. 27, which excludes con-
senting to sexual relationships from the general best interests decision-making framework of the
MCA. Instead, where an individual is assessed as lacking capacity to consent to sexual relations,
this catalyses a range of potentially restrictive interventions aimed at preventing that person from
engaging in such relations, which can involve significant interferences with their rights to respect
for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on the Human Rights.11
Our arguments in this article are focused on improving practice under the MCA, though we rec-
ognize that there are some who argue that the MCA needs more fundamental reform.12 We do
not contribute directly to that debate here, but instead consider how the implementation of the
current law could be improved within the MCA framework.
We begin with a methodological overview of the CoP research underpinning our arguments,
followed by a discussion of the approach to capacity to consent to sex under the MCA, as it has
evolved in case law and academic commentary. We then turn to explore how using the tools pro-
vided by the capabilities approach to justice could improve outcomes for disabled people. Finally,
we apply capabilities theory to findings from our observational and case file research in the CoP
to provide an understanding of how CoP practice could be developed to support disabled people,
moving away from prioritizing medical risks to focusing more clearly on consensual intimacy.
2 METHODOLOGY
In this article, we draw on original empirical data from CoP observations and case files to inter-
rogate how the law in this area works in practice, rather than solely relying on reported case law.
The persistent ‘gap’ between how law works in practice and law as written in books has long
been a major concern of law and society scholarship,13 and this article contributes to that litera-
ture, while adding perspectives from capabilities theory. CoP data drawn on here were collected
from research carried out at the CoP between January and December 2016. Before the research
began, ethical approval was granted by a University Research Ethics Committee and approval was
10 Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, op. cit., n. 3; Clough, op. cit., n. 3.
11 Human Rights Act 1998; A Local Authority v. H (No. 2) [2019] EWCOP 51.
12 M. Donnelly, ‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to Say Goodbye?’ (2016) 24 Medical Law Rev. 318; R.
Harding, ‘The Rise of Statutory Wills and the Limits of Best Interests Decision-Making in Inheritance’ (2015) 78Modern
Law Rev. 945; W. Martin et al., The Essex Autonomy Project Three Jurisdictions Report: Towards Compliance with CRPD
Article 12 in Capacity/Incapacity Legislation across the UK (2016).
13 See, for example, R. Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 Am. Law Rev. 12; A. Sarat, ‘Legal Effectiveness
and Social Studies of Law’ (1985) 9 Legal Studies Forum 23; S. Silbey, ‘After Legal Consciousness’ (2005) 1 Annual Rev. of
Law and Social Science 323.
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also received from Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS), the Ministry of Justice
(including a Privileged Access Agreement), and the (then) Vice President of the Court of Protec-
tion, Mr Justice Charles. HMCTS authorized in-depth analysis of 20 case files relating to capacity
to consent to sex, capacity to marry, and capacity to make decisions about contact. Case files for
inclusion in the research were selected by a court officer and set aside for review. A standardized
case file review template was used to gather information from the 20 case files set aside. In total,
eight of these 20 cases were additionally observed over 14 days throughout the 12-month period.
Parties to these 20 selected cases were sent information about the study by the court officer,
including participant information sheets, consent forms, contact details for the researcher, and
information that the researcher may observe hearings in their case. They were also advised that
consent to attend the hearing would be sought on the day if not provided in advance.14 On the day
of each hearing, the researcher again sought consent to observe from the participants in atten-
dance. In each case attended, no party objected to the hearing being observed and the judge was
also supportive of the observation. Research is only possible with people who lack capacity to
participate in research if certain criteria are met, set out under MCA, s. 30. This study did not
fall within MCA, s. 30 as it sought only to include participants who had capacity to consent to
participate in observational research, which is a relatively low threshold. Capacity was presumed,
as required by MCA, s. 1(2), and when seeking consent on the day of each hearing from the par-
ties, no concerns were raised by any person about individual participants’ capacity to consent to
participate. Verbatim notes were made on the day of the hearings and fieldnotes were also typed
up during and after observation. Information accessed as part of the research varied depending
on the case. In all but one observed case, additional material was available, including hearing
bundles, skeleton arguments, expert reports, and witness statements. This information was not
always contained in the case files, as some files were more detailed than others depending on the
location of the court.15 The person at the centre of the proceedings only gave evidence to the court
in one observed case, but attended in two others.16
Observational research at the CoP facilitated a deeper understanding of the culture of the pro-
ceedings,17 providing a greater insight into CoP practice than doctrinal analysis of reported case
law allows. We acknowledge that being an observer is neither a neutral nor a static position and
that observational research does not necessarily uncover all of the details about a case. Observa-
tional research involves an interaction with the practices of the CoP, including with court officers,
judges, and case participants,18 and is not an entirely objective process. To address these limita-
tions of observational research, our data is complemented by other sources, including case file
reviews and relevant reported case law. Summary details about each of the 20 cases analysed can
be found in Table 1. All references to CoP participants in this table and throughout the article are
anonymized.
14 For further information about the ethics processes, see J. Lindsey, ‘Protecting and Empowering Vulnerable Adults: Men-
tal Capacity Law in Practice’ (2018) PhD thesis, University of Birmingham.
15 For further discussion in more detail about CoP case files, see L. Series et al., ‘Welfare Cases in the Court of Protection:
A Statistical Overview’ (2017) at <http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wccop/files/2017/09/Series-Fennell-Doughty-2017-Statistical-
overview-of-CoP.pdf>.
16 See J. Lindsey, ‘Testimonial Injustice andVulnerability: AQualitativeAnalysis of Participation in theCourt of Protection’
(2019) 28 Social &Legal Studies 4, formore in-depth analysis of the issues arising fromP’s participation inCoP proceedings.
17 M. Jacob,Matching Organs with Donors: Legality and Kinship in Transplants (2012).
18 K. Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter’ (2003) 28 Signs: J.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As can be seen in Table 1, while the selection criteria for case files were focused on disputes
about capacity to make decisions about sex, marriage, or contact, the majority (n = 18, 90 per
cent) of these cases involved allegations of abuse in some form, including domestic abuse (n= 8),
forcedmarriage (n= 6), and alleged perpetrator of sexual offences (n= 4). In 16 (80 per cent) of the
case files, the disabled person at the centre of the proceedings was the victim or potential victim of
abuse or non-consensual sex; in the remaining four cases (20 per cent), the person at the heart of
proceedings was thought to be at risk of perpetrating sexual offences. As we show in our analysis
below, the CoP’s approach to capacity to consent to (or engage in) sex continues to emphasize the
medical risks of sexual relations, rather than the risks associatedwith non-consensual sex, despite
the prevalence of abuse across the case files reviewed and CoP hearings observed.
3 DISABILITY AND CONSENT TO SEX: SOCIO-LEGAL
APPROACHES
A systematic review of available evidence found that ‘[a]dults with disabilities are at a higher risk
of violence than are non-disabled adults, and those with mental illnesses could be particularly
vulnerable’.19 The lack of protection from violence exposed by this elevated risk is even starker
for disabled women, particularly those subjected to sexual assault.20 This increased risk is part of
the rationale for additional duties placed on State Parties by CRPD, Article 16 to protect disabled
people’s rights to freedom from exploitation, violence, and abuse. We consider that this backdrop
of abuse shapes the application of the test for capacity to consent to sex. In this section, we set out
the legal test for capacity to consent to sex as it has developed in the CoP. Specifically, we agree
with the Court of Appeal decision in A Local Authority v. JB,21 which requires that consent is a
central part of the test for sexual capacity.
3.1 The legal test for capacity to consent to sex
Under the MCA, lack of capacity to make a decision arises when a person (after being provided
with all practicable steps to support them) is, as a result of an impairment or disturbance in the
functioning of their mind or brain, unable to understand, use or weigh, or retain information rel-
evant to the decision, or to communicate their decision.22 What constitutes that ‘relevant infor-
mation’ has been the subject of significant jurisprudence of the CoP. The initial decision setting
out the test for capacity to consent to sex is surprisingly recent,23 but draws, implicitly, on a long
history of seeking to manage and control the sexuality of intellectually disabled people.24 The
19 K. Hughes et al., ‘Prevalence and Risk of Violence against Adults with Disabilities: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis of Observational Studies’ (2012) 379 Lancet 1621, at 1621.
20 J. Benedet and I. Grant, ‘Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority for Women with Mental Disabilities’
(2014) 22 Feminist Legal Studies 131.
21A Local Authority v. JB [2020] EWCA Civ 735.
22 MCA, ss. 1–3.
23X City Council v.MB, NB and MAB [2006] EWHC 168.
24 Sandland, op. cit., n. 1.
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current test, developed through a line of cases,25 suggests that the information relevant to capac-
ity to consent to sex may include:
a. the sexual nature and character of the activity (including the mechanics of the sexual act);
b. that there are health risks involved, particularly the acquisition of sexually transmitted and
sexually transmissible infections;
c. that sex between a man and a woman may result in the woman becoming pregnant;
d. that sex is a choice and therefore that P can say yes or no to sexual relations;
e. that the other person must have capacity to engage in sexual relations and must consent.26
The first part of the test has focused predominantly on the functional and physical aspects of sex.
It is understood to be a very low threshold and is rarely problematic in CoP cases. The second part
of the test, understanding health risks, most often requires an understanding that sexual activity
can result in STIs. The third aspect requires an understanding of the possibility of pregnancy,
though not the more remote consequences of pregnancy, like midwifery care, giving birth, or the
possibility of a child being removed.27
Through these first three requirements, the test focuses on a particular type of sexual act: vagi-
nal heterosexual intercourse between fertilemales and females. This has led to the test for capacity
to consent to sex, for the purposes of the MCA, to be described as ‘act-specific’ or ‘issue-specific’
rather than ‘person-specific’ or ‘situation-specific’.28 This is, of course, in contrast to the central
importance of consent in criminal proceedings about sexual offences, where Baroness Hale said:
[I]t is difficult to think of an activitywhich ismore person- and situation-specific than
sexual relations. One does not consent to sex in general. One consents to this act of
sex with this person at this time and in this place. Autonomy entails the freedom and
the capacity to make a choice of whether or not to do so.29
Amore individualized approach, which places act-specific understandings of capacity in a partic-
ular situational context, gained further traction in the CoP recently throughHayden J’s decision in
The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v.NB. In that case, Hayden J’s approach was that the infor-
mation relevant to the decision should be variable depending on the particular circumstances
of the case. He stated ‘that there is no need to evaluate an understanding of pregnancy when
assessing consent to sexual relations in same-sex relationships or with women who are infertile
or post-menopausal strikes me as redundant of any contrary argument’.30
While a variable test has some intuitive appeal, it sits uneasily with the act-specific approach
to capacity to consent to sexual relationships that has developed through previous case law.31 The
25 Recent cases include Re NB [2019] EWCOP 17; Re B (Capacity: Social Media: Care and Contact) [2019] EWCOP 3.
26 Affirmed in A Local Authority v. JB, op. cit., n. 21, building on a list of authorities including: Local Authority X v. MM
[2007] EWHC 2003; D Borough Council v. AB [2011] EWHC 101; The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v. TB and SA, op.
cit., n. 7; IM v. (1) LM (2) AB (3) Liverpool City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 37.
27 In Re A (Capacity: Refusal of Contraception) [2011] Fam 61; In Re M (An Adult) (Capacity: Consent to Sexual Relations)
[2015] Fam 61, [2014] EWCA Civ 37.
28 See Herring and Wall, op. cit., n. 3 for discussion of the reasoning in the Court of Appeal in In Re M, id. on this issue.
29 R v. Cooper [2009] UK HL 42, at [27].
30 The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v. NB [2019] EWCOP 27, at [54].
31 In Re M, op. cit., n. 27 confirmed the act-specific approach.
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act-specific approach requires that a personmust understand sex in general rather than in relation
to a specific person. It is therefore difficult to reconcile with a variable test, which inevitably turns,
to some degree at least, on the characteristics of the sexual partner (in other words, sex/gender,
fertility, and disease status), even where these have an impact on the level or nature of the risk.
The fourth and fifth features of the test are essentially about the importance of consent.32 Taken
together, they require that P understands that sex is a choice to which both parties must consent,
and to which either party can say no. This is, in our view, fundamental to sexual capacity even
though these consent parts of the legal test have hadmuch less influence in CoP practice,33 despite
consent forming some part of the test for assessing sexual capacity since at least 2012.34 To some
extent, this is because of the developing nature of the legal test in this area, as we outline in the
following section, but we also consider the socio-legal question of the failure to focus on consent
in the final part of this article.
3.2 Towards a consent-focused test for engaging in sex
The relevance of understanding consent as a part of sexual capacity was recently considered by
the Court of Appeal in two cases. First, in brief obiter comments in B v. A Local Authority,35 the
Court ofAppeal quoted the earlier decision inLondonBorough of Southwark v.KA&Ors to explain
that understanding that you can say no to sex is an issue that goes ‘to the root of capacity itself’
and is ‘more than just an item of relevant information’.36 Yet, if understanding that a person can
say no to engaging in sexual relations was not part of the relevant information, the legal status of
consent in the test for sexual capacity was unclear. This approachwas, in our view, rightly rejected
in the Court of Appeal decision in A Local Authority v. JB, where the issue of consent was central.
That case concerned a mental capacity declaration sought in relation to a 36-year-old man who
was perceived to be a risk to others and had significant limitations placed on his independence
‘primarily in order to prevent him from behaving in a sexually inappropriate manner towards
women’.37 At first instance, Roberts J held that understanding that the other party must consent
to sex is not relevant to the legal test for sexual capacity, though it might be relevant to how that
capacity is exercised in practice.38 The Court of Appeal, overturning Roberts J’s decision, held that
the test was actually whether or not a person had capacity to engage in sexual relations. When the
test is framed that way,
it becomes clear that the ‘information relevant to the decision’ inevitably includes the
fact that any personwithwhomP engages in sexual activitymust be able to consent to
such activity and does in fact consent to it. Sexual relations betweenhumanbeings are
mutually consensual. It is one of the many features that makes us unique. A person
32 See A Local Authority v. JB, op. cit., n. 21.
33 Affirmed recently by the Court of Appeal in id.
34 See A Local Authority v.H, op. cit, n. 7 and subsequent case law such as The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v. TB and
SA, op. cit., n. 7.
35 B v. A Local Authority [2019] EWCA Civ 913.
36 Id., para. 51, quoting from the judgment in London Borough of Southwark v. KA & Ors [2016] EWCOP 20.
37A Local Authority v. JB [2019] EWCOP 39, para. 3.
38 Id., para. 80.
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who does not understand that sexual relations must only take place when, and only
for as long as, the other person is consenting is unable to understand a fundamental
part of the information relevant to the decision whether or not to engage in such
relations.39
This Court of Appeal decision makes clear that consent (both in respect of giving and receiv-
ing consent) forms part of the legal test for capacity to engage in sexual relations. Incorporating
consent in this way does not require that the individual understands all of the possible criminal
implications of sexual contact. Rather, it protects the individual from the serious consequences
that follow from criminal prosecution for sexual assault, rape, or other offences under the Sexual
Offences Act 2003. As Baker LJ perceptively stated:
[a]s illustrated by the background history to this application, which includes an inci-
dent of alleged sexual abuse in respect of which the police decided to take no action,
the criminal justice system does not necessarily deal with such cases . . . [T]o leave
such matters to the criminal justice system would be an abdication of the fundamen-
tal responsibilities of the Court of Protection.40
The JB decision aligns with our argument in this article because it reflects the fact that many
cases on sexual capacity that reach the CoP are fundamentally about allegations of abuse. Of the
20 CoP case files analysed, 18 involved allegations of abuse, even though the criteria for inclusion
in the sample was sex, marriage, and contact cases, not specifically cases of abuse.41 Of the ten
case files reviewed where capacity to consent to sex was investigated, five expressly used a three-
stage test for capacity covering only the first three elements.42 Of the remaining five cases, only
one (Y County Council v. LC) expressly used the four-stage test incorporating the ability to say
no. Further, almost all reported capacity to consent to sex cases from the CoP or Court of Appeal
in recent years have included some allegations of exploitation or abuse.43 This suggests that the
primary concerns in sexual capacity cases have never been about the risks of pregnancy or STIs,
but about the abuse of vulnerable adults who are at risk of non-consensual sex.44 While JB may
change this position in respect of Ps who are unable to understand that the other party needs to
consent, we think that it is less likely to change the interpretation in cases where P herself is the
person at risk. This socio-legal question of why consent has not been considered more centrally
39A Local Authority v. JB, op. cit., n. 21, para. 94.
40 Id., para. 97.
41 Cases that included capacity to make decisions about contact were also included within the sample, as it became clear
that many cases where there were concerns around sexual relationships were dealt with using alternative means of inter-
vention.
42K County Council v.MW;WCounty Council v. ZR; K County Council v. SL; H County Council v. XC; A County Council v.
MT.
43A Local Authority v. H, op. cit., n. 7; A Local Authority v. TZ [2013] EWCOP 2322; PC v. York City Council [2013] EWCA
Civ 478; Derbyshire County Council v. AC [2014] EWCOP 38; The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v. TB and SA, op. cit.,
n. 7; IM v. (1) LM (2) AB (3) Liverpool City Council, op. cit., n. 26; Re P [2018] EWCOP 10; Manchester City Council v. LC
[2018] EWCOP 30; Re NB, op. cit., n. 25; A Local Authority v. JB, op. cit., n. 21.
44 For further discussion of this point, see J. Lindsey, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Adults from Abuse: Under-Protection and
Over-Protection in Adult Safeguarding and Mental Capacity Law’ (2020) 32 Child and Family Law Q. 2.
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in the cases that reach the CoP, even when the legal position was that consent goes to the root of
capacity, is an important one to which we return in the second half of this article.
There have been concerns expressed that a consent-focused test for capacity would raise the
threshold of who is able to engage in intimacy in practice. We disagree that this would necessarily
follow. First, it would require asking whether a person understands consent. This includes under-
standing that they can communicate yes or no and can make their own choice about whether
and what sexual practices they, and the other person, engage in. This would involve being able to
describe, in simple terms,what consent is and give examples of how a personmay give orwithhold
consent in practice. This is not necessarily a higher threshold that expects them to understand the
criminal law, but it is a test that gets closer to the heart of the issue. Furthermore, decisions about
contact, care, and residence are regularly used as mechanisms for controlling the sexual lives of
disabled people who are found to have capacity to consent to sex under the original three-part
test. For example, in a number of reported cases, the courts have reached a different conclusion in
regard to a person’s capacity to consent to contact compared to their capacity to consent to sexual
activity.45
In the literature, this has been framed as a conflict between act-specific and person-specific
approaches to sexual consent.46 That is, the courts have found that under the act-specific approach
P has capacity to consent to sex but under the person-specific approach P has been found to lack
capacity to decide with whom she should have (sexual) contact. Unlike sex and marriage, capac-
ity to make decisions about contact can be person-specific.47 Clough has argued that having an
act-specific approach to sex and marriage, but a person-specific approach to contact, promotes
liberty by maximizing the number of people who are able to enjoy intimate relationships without
interference.48 This approachmeans that individuals are able to have intimate relationships but it
provides the state with some ability to supervise their contact with abusive others. However, this
distinction has been criticized by others who see it as unprincipled and illogical.49
Our argument is rather different. We consider that approaching capacity to consent to sex as a
low threshold that can be undermined by setting a higher threshold for making decisions about
contact creates a mere illusion of respect for the sexual and autonomy rights of intellectually dis-
abled people. Through this approach, those individuals found to have capacity to consent to sex
are subjected to intrusive monitoring and filtering of their contact with others, not only prospec-
tive sexual partners. This then seeks to move sexual consent, which is rightly excluded from the
third-party decision-making framework of theMCA, back into the best interests framework of the
Act. As a consequence, disabled people’s sexual lives are subjected to supervision, interference,
and vetting by professionals, potentially leading to breaches of their rights to privacy and family
life.
Instead, the legal test for capacity to consent to sex must (and to some extent now does) focus
explicitly on consent (of all parties), both in respect of giving consent and withholding it. This
would better deal with the issues before the court in sexual capacity cases and more accurately
45 Local Authority X v. MM, op. cit., n. 26; Derbyshire County Council v. AC, op. cit., n. 43; A Local Authority v. TZ (No. 2)
[2014] EWHC 973.
46 See Herring, op. cit., n. 3; Series, op. cit., n. 3.
47 York City Council v. C and another [2013] EWCA Civ 478 para. 35.
48 Clough, op. cit., n. 3.
49 A. Ruck Keene et al., ‘Carrying Out and Recording Capacity Assessments’ (2020) at<https://www.39essex.com/mental-
capacity-guidance-note-brief-guide-carrying-capacity-assessments/>.
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capture why there is a need for a capacity test in relation to sex at all: to provide protection for
disabled adults who may be sexually assaulted or abused, or be perpetrators of sexual offences.
In the remainder of this article, we seek to demonstrate, using our empirical data and informed
by the capabilities approach to justice, how an approach to capacity to consent to sexual relations
that focuses on consent would better respond to the problems identified above and reflect a more
honest approach to these issues.
4 CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY
In this section, we respond to the challenges identified above through the lens of the capabilities
approach to justice. We argue that the capabilities approach provides a different way of viewing
sexual intimacy, which can help to justify a more explicit focus on the social risks of intimate
relationships in CoP cases, such as non-consensual sex, while balancing against inappropriate
paternalism through setting too high a threshold for capacity. We argue that there is a need to
provide contextual support to improve understanding before decisions about capacity are made.
AsClough explains, ‘promoting autonomy and resilience through responsive and appropriate sup-
port can be contrasted from an approachwhich sees non-interference as preferable’.50 Legally, this
is already provided for by the principles within the MCA, which include a requirement that ‘all
practicable steps’ be taken to help a person to make their own decision before a finding of inca-
pacity is made and that the least restrictive optionmust be taken.51 Yet research on the implemen-
tation of the MCA has consistently found that this entitlement to support has not been realized
in practice.52 Here, we argue that the capabilities approach provides a convincing social justice
argument to underpin the claim for the resources necessary to help a person to achieve capacity,
something that has not been achieved through the MCA alone, notwithstanding that there is a
right to support embedded in the foundational legal principles of the Act.
The capabilities approach does not map directly onto a capacity analysis and we are not seek-
ing to suggest that it can change mental capacity law. However, capacity is likely to be facili-
tated through professionals and practitioners taking a capabilities approach to these issues. This
is because the capabilities approach encourages those working with disabled people to view the
issue of sexual intimacy from a different perspective: one that promotes the development of the
capability to protect bodily health and integrity, develop emotional affiliations, develop an under-
standing and practice of intimacy, and be supported to achieve all of these in context. While it
may not ultimately lead to a different outcome in all CoP cases (because capacity is still the legal
requirement), the capabilities approach might help to shift the focus away from impairments and
towards the need to provide support and the opportunity to develop the necessary capabilities to
lead a fulfilled intimate life.
50 Clough, op. cit., n. 3, p. 13.
51 MCA, s. 1(2)–(6).
52 House of Lords, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny (2014); R. Harding and E. Taşcıoğlu, Everyday
Decisions Project Report: Supporting Legal Capacity through Care, Support and Empowerment (2017); R. Harding and E.
Taşcıoğlu, ‘Supported Decision-Making from Theory to Practice: Implementing the Right to Enjoy Legal Capacity’ (2018)
8 Societies 25.
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4.1 The capabilities approach
In common with a rising number of disability scholars, we argue that the capabilities approach
has much to offer in advancing understandings of intellectually disabled people’s rights to form
rewarding, consensual, intimate relationships.53 The capabilities approach, particularly in the
form espoused by Amartya Sen,54 has been influential in international human rights contexts.
As Mitra has stated, ‘[i]n Sen’s approach, capabilitymeans “practical opportunity”’.55 By focusing
on the opportunities, and freedom, that individuals have to do and be what they choose, capabil-
ities require a more substantive approach to equality and justice than other forms of protecting
individuals from discrimination and oppression.
At its core, the capabilities approach is a theory of justice that provides a framework for iden-
tifying how resources should be fairly distributed. It provides a political justification as to why
and how resources should be used in particular ways. The approach is based on respect for
dignity and ensuring that humans can achieve certain core capabilities. Nussbaum’s approach
to capabilities theory draws on the Rawlsian conception of justice,56 but does so in a way that
she says gives ‘shape and content to the abstract idea of dignity’.57 In advancing this approach,
Nussbaum argues that it is possible to set out a list of capabilities that form ‘minimum core
social entitlements’ that are ‘compatible with different views about how to handle issues of jus-
tice and distribution . . . above the threshold level’.58 Nussbaum’s central capabilities list covers:
life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason;
affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s political and material environment.59 Sexu-
ality, intimacy, and relationships engage many of these central capabilities. Emotions, for exam-
ple, includes support for the development of positive emotional attachments to others. Affiliation
includes important dimensions of living in social relationships and engaging in social interac-
tion. Bodily health includes reproductive health.60 The capability for bodily integrity includes
‘being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sex-
ual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in
matters of reproduction’.61 Importantly, Nussbaum argues that these capabilities are all required.
Through the lens of the capabilities approach, it would not be sufficient to protect bodily health
and bodily integrity by preventing disabled people from forming emotional attachments, intimate
relationships, or affiliations.
In using the capabilities approach, we are attentive to its limitations and critiques, particu-
larly in the ways in which some capabilities scholars have engaged with the challenges posed by
53 A. Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’
(2006) 34 Syracuse J. of International Law and Commerce 429; Clough, op. cit., n. 3; B. Clough, ‘“People Like That”: Real-
ising the Social Model in Mental Capacity Jurisprudence’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Rev. 53; A. Arstein-Kerslake, Restoring
Voice to People with Cognitive Disabilities: Realizing the Right to Equal Recognition before the Law (2017).
54 Sen, op. cit., n. 9.
55 S. Mitra, ‘The Capability Approach and Disability’ (2006) 16 J. of Disability Policy Studies 236, at 238.
56 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2005).
57 Nussbaum, op. cit. (2007), n. 9, p. 75.
58 Id.
59 Nussbaum, op. cit. (2013), n. 9.
60 Nussbaum, op. cit. (2007), n. 9, p. 76.
61 Id.
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cognitive disability. For example, many scholars active in disability studies or who agree with
the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities about Arti-
cle 1262 would seriously object to the threefold classification of cognitively disabled people pro-
posed by Nussbaum,63 which suggests that guardianship and substituted decision making is the
appropriate response for anyone who requires decision-making support. Harnacke, for example,
argues that while the capabilities approach holds potential for helping to realize the rights in
the CRPD, it fails because it does not prioritize or differentiate between the capabilities in a way
that would guide procedural implementation of those rights.64 Others have used the capabilities
approach effectively in the disability context. For example, Mitra has used it to show how dis-
ability can develop from personal characteristics of the individual, resources, and environmental
factors rather than being viewed as an inherent characteristic.65 By this, she means that what is
required to achieve a particular capability depends on the range of factors, and how they interact,
in an individual context. Similarly, as Clough explains, the focus of the capabilities approach is
on the way in which the environmental, cultural, political, and economic context can
hinder or facilitate an individual’s enjoyment of certain capabilities. Without paying
attention to these factors, claims about particular individuals’ enjoyment of certain
rights and freedoms are incomplete.66
Building on capabilities theory, we consider that an individual is generally entitled, as a matter
of justice, to be supported to develop internal capabilities and be given opportunities and experi-
ences to exercise them (whichNussbaum calls combined capabilities), which are sensitive to their
own needs, differences, characteristics, and circumstances.67 This means responding to the dif-
ferent needs of individuals differently to ensure that they are able to develop their capabilities to
health, bodily integrity, and intimacy in ways that suit the pursuit of their own life goals.68 Strong
realization of the capabilities approach in this context would require that individuals are pro-
vided with the opportunity to develop an understanding of models of intimacy that are relevant
for them, rather than being subject to declarations of incapacity from the CoP to justify restric-
tive care plans. In the area of intimacy, this would mean being supported to develop the internal
capacity to understand sexual activity and being situated within external conditions that provide
the opportunity to develop capacity for sexual intimacy relevant to that individual’s own intimate
62 See, for example, A.Arstein-Kerslake andE. Flynn, ‘TheGeneral Comment onArticle 12 of theConvention on theRights
of Persons with Disabilities: A Roadmap for Equality before the Law’ (2016) 20 The International J. of Human Rights 471;
R. Harding, ‘The Rise of StatutoryWills and the Limits of Best Interests Decision-Making in Inheritance’ (2015) 78Modern
Law Rev. 945.
63 M. C. Nussbaum, ‘The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities’ in Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to
Moral Philosophy, eds E. F. Kittay and L. Carlson (2010) 75.
64 C. Harnacke, ‘Disability and Capability: Exploring the Usefulness of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach for the
UN Disability Rights Convention’ (2013) 41 J. of Law Medicine & Ethics 768.
65 Mitra, op. cit., n. 55.
66 Clough, op. cit., n. 53, p. 68.
67 Nussbaum, op. cit. (2001), n. 9, pp. 84–85; L. Terzi, ‘Beyond the Dilemma of Difference: The Capability Approach to
Disability and Special Educational Needs’ (2005) 39 J. of Philosophy of Education 44.
68 V. A. Entwistle and I. S. Watt, ‘Treating Patients as Persons: A Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-
Centered Care’ (2013) 13 Am. J. of Bioethics 29.
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desires in practice. It also requires that the practice of consensual sexual intimacy happens in an
environment that supports bodily integrity and ensures that the person is free from sexual abuse.
4.2 Capabilities, sexuality, and intimacy
Focusing on the internal ability to understand and communicate an understanding of the health
risks of sex does not, in our view, properly capture the essence of the potential harms of sexual
relationships. If the individual does not understand sexual activity as a mutual practice, then they
are at risk of being either a victim or perpetrator of sexual assault when putting their desires for
sexual intimacy into practice. Until recently, the approach to sexuality in the MCA appeared to
require the possession of internal capabilities, with little regard to the external conditions (and
support for those conditions) within which sexual expression develops. Yet in light of the CRPD
and a greater attentiveness to the importance of targeted support,69 there has been some move-
ment towards combined capabilities in mental capacity law and practice.
The requirement to understand the risks of pregnancy and STIs does provide some protection
for the central combined capability of bodily health. Yet if a person is unable to describe the health
risks associated with sexual relations, then they may be denied the opportunity to engage in inti-
macy unless or until they develop the required understanding. The result of doing so could then be
restrictive of other capabilities, like emotion or affiliation. Consequentially, a lack in one capabil-
ity is used as a justification for restricting access to other central capabilities, instead of facilitating
the development of better understanding of the health risks of sexual intimacy so that the person
can achieve the necessary understanding. The capabilities approach, therefore, offers a set of per-
suasive social justice arguments to establish a moral duty on the state to provide the resources
necessary to enable this support to be realized in practice.
An example of this can be seen in the reported case of Re CH.70 In that case, a 38-year-old
man with Down’s syndrome was awarded damages for the breach of his Article 8 rights under
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as protected by section 6(1) of the Human
Rights Act 1998. Damages were awarded for the delay of more than 12months in the provision of a
sexual education programme, during which time CH was prevented from having sexual relations
with his wife, who also withdrew ‘to another bedroom and withheld much physical affection’, so
as ‘not to lead him on’ – actions that were described as having a ‘profound’ impact on CH.71 The
award of damages in this case serves as a useful reminder to local authorities that they must meet
their obligations to support and facilitate capacity (and capabilities) as required by the CRPD.
Capabilities theory requires that opportunities are not denied on the basis of a lack of the neces-
sary internal (or combined) capabilities – in fact, quite the opposite; a person should be given the
opportunity to develop such capabilities on the basis of a human entitlement to having that capa-
bility. Lacking the capability to understand or maintain one’s own reproductive health or bodily
integrity does not provide a justification for preventing a person from engaging in activities that
might put those things at risk. Rather, the capabilities approach provides a justification for an
entitlement to develop the necessary capabilities and a related moral obligation on the state to pro-
vide her with the support that she requires to do so. The capabilities approach therefore provides
69 The need for person-centred support and/or care is a central part of the capabilities approach to these issues; see id.
70 Re CH (by his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) v. AMetropolitan Council [2017] EWCOP 12.
71 Id., 19.
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a way of refocusing the legal issue of capacity to consent to sex on the ways in which a person can
be supported to reach certain minimum capabilities before they are denied the chance to pursue
intimate relationships.
Our approach, which grounds sexuality in consensual, mutual, and positive relationships that
engage multiple capabilities, would additionally focus the minds of professionals working with
disabled adults to encourage, educate, and support them in making informed decisions about
intimacy. Our aim is not to leave disabled adults unprotected. Rather, reframing the capacity
threshold in the way in which we suggest would remind those working with disabled adults that
developing the capability (and capacity) for sexual intimacy goes beyond universal understanding
of the health risks such as STIs or pregnancy to include understanding the consensual nature of
such relationships.
5 CAPABILITIES IN PRACTICE: FROMMEDICALIZATION
AND CONTROL TO CONSENT AND SUPPORT
Our observation and analysis of CoP cases show that, in practice, the test for capacity to consent
to sex has focused on P’s understanding of pregnancy and STIs, rather than on consent. This rep-
resents a medicalized approach to the risks of sexual relations, perhaps influenced by the weight
placed on medical evidence in CoP proceedings.72 Medicalization is not always problematic as
it can lead to the development of new technologies and treatments to alleviate disease and suf-
fering. Similarly, it can help to minimize the disappointments of ‘natural’ inequalities, such as
through the provision of assisted reproductive technologies to the infertile.73 Yet the normaliza-
tion of medicalization can also create gaps in our understanding of practices that do not primarily
require a medical response. Considering which practices and events are medicalized, and in what
ways, can help to highlight the gaps in our understanding whenwe do resort tomedicalization. In
sexual relations, the potential for an STI or pregnancy to result means that the practice of sexual
relations is medicalized.74 In other words, intimacy is seen as requiring a medical intervention
such as contraception. While this is not necessarily a problem as many people would benefit from
learning about contraception, the resort to medicalization simultaneously disregards other risks
of sexual relations, such as non-consensual sex. The risks of sex that relate to the capability for
bodily integrity, such as sexual assault, are sidelined by the medicalized, act-specific approach to
sexual relations.75 We are not suggesting that understanding the bodily health risks of sex is not
important; rather, we argue that there has been a failure to focus on equally important issues of
consent in these cases because the CoP takes a medicalized approach to capacity.
72 P. Case, ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Psychiatry and Law in the Court of Protection: Expert Discourses of “Insight” (and “Com-
pliance”)’ (2016) 24Medical Law Rev. 360; J. Lindsey, ‘Competing Professional Knowledge Claims about Mental Capacity
in the Court of Protection’ (2020) 28Medical Law Rev. 1.
73 A. V. Bell, ‘TheMargins ofMedicalization: Diversity and Context through the Case of Infertility’ (2016) 156 Social Science
& Medicine 39.
74 See, for example, Bell’s discussion of the medicalization of reproduction: id.
75 For example, there are a number of reported cases where therewere allegations of sexual violence that were not pursued:
see Derbyshire County Council v. AC, op. cit., n. 43; The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v. TB and SA, op. cit., n. 7;
Birmingham City Council v. Riaz and others [2014] EWHC 4247.
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Expert witnesses in the CoP commonly use medicalized approaches to assess capacity.76 This
is arguably because capacity is often considered to be a clinical question, which can be assessed
through cognitive tests or other quasi-objective measurements used by psychiatrists to aid diag-
nosis.77 The emphasis on the medical (or health) risks of sexual relations is perhaps unsurprising
given the weight attached to medical expertise in the CoP, something clear from this empirical
research that has been published elsewhere.78 The medicalization of capacity was also readily
apparent from the CoP case files reviewed. For example, in KCounty Council v. SL, notes from the
case file suggested that SL’s understanding of infection was central to the issue of capacity. The
expert stated that he thought SL lacked capacity to consent to sex but said:
I would have to revise this opinion if a person [probably a woman speaking to her
alone] was able to get her to describe the sexual act in simple terms and of the risks
of infection. I do not think this is likely but am less certain in this case than I am in
most cases.
In this case, following educative work, the expert changed his opinion, finding that SL had capac-
ity to consent to sex, and proceedings were withdrawn.While this focus on support and education
is to be commended, the primary focus on disease and mechanics remained, and was reinforced
in another case, K County Council v. MW, where the expert clinical psychologist explained her
approach to assessing MW’s sexual capacity using a training pack from the British Institute of
Learning Disability.
Here, the expert concluded that MW had capacity to consent to sexual relations, noting:
MW demonstrated understanding of the male and female body parts and of sexual
behaviour (with the exception of anal sex, which she showed recognition for when
told). She also demonstrated an understanding of the mechanics of the act and that
a consequence of sex was ‘disease . . . get sick afterwards’, and that condoms could
prevent this. She also knew that condoms could be used to prevent pregnancy. She
lacked awareness of alternative forms of contraception.
The consequences of sex are very narrowly defined here and have, like many other areas of CoP
practice, become medicalized. This is despite the fact that most sexual intimacy results in neither
pregnancy nor infection and research evidence demonstrates that low awareness of the medical
risks of sex is not limited to disabled people. For example, evidence from Public Health England
shows that in 2015 there were approximately 435,000 diagnoses of STIs in England and cases most
commonly related to young heterosexuals under the age of 25 years and men who have sex with
men.79 Evidence from research with young people suggests that many ‘felt that that they ought to
76 See the guidance produced by the BritishMedical Association and Law Society and by the British Psychological Society:
A. Ruck Keene (ed.) Assessment of Mental Capacity: A Practical Guide for Doctors and Lawyers (2015); C. Herbert et al.,
Capacity to Consent to Sexual Relations (2019) at<https://www.bps.org.uk/sites/www.bps.org.uk/files/Policy/Policy%20-
%20Files/Capacity%20to%20consent%20to%20sexual%20relations.pdf>.
77 See further Lindsey, op. cit., n. 72.
78 Id. See also Case, op. cit., n. 72.
79 Public Health England, Health Protection Report: Sexually Transmitted Infections and Chlamydia Screening in England,
2015 (2016) Vol. 10, No. 22, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559993/
hpr2216_stis_CRRCTD4.pdf>.
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have known more when they first felt ready to have some sexual experience’.80 Women in partic-
ular were ‘more likely to report having wanted to knowmore about “contraception/birth control”
(27.5% . . . vs 19.3% . . . ) and “how to say no” (16.6% . . . vs 10.7% . . . ) thanmen’.81 Similar educational
and social barriers to understanding sex have been found for adults with disabilities.82 There is,
therefore, a widespread misunderstanding about the risks of sexual relations across a range of
age groups, socio-economic categories, and intellectual abilities. Developing the capability of all
individuals to better understand the multiple risks of sexual relations, including the social chal-
lenges of consent, should be a key aim of sex and relationships education, whether in schools, in
the home, or through community services. This would allow everyone to understand the ways in
which sex and sexuality impact on bodily health as well as the importance of emotion, affiliation,
and the tools required to protect bodily integrity.
A capabilities analysis encourages us to look at an individual’s functioning and decide what
skills that individual needs to be capable of intimacy in the context of their own lives. In some
instances, this will be understanding of pregnancy and STIs; in others, consent will be the central
issue. A more careful analysis of these issues is required, alongside a legal test that is sufficiently
flexible to respond to the individuals before the court. Understanding decisions to consent to sex-
ual relationships through the interlinked capabilities of bodily health, bodily integrity, emotion,
and affiliation would allow more nuanced engagement with the specificities of the relationship
in question, while remaining attentive to the importance of the multiple risks of sexual relations.
Another observed case, Y County Council v. LC, provides a useful case study for exploration of
these issues in more detail. This case, observed in 2016, concerned LC’s capacity to marry and to
consent to sexual relations. LC was in her early twenties and was described in the case as having
autism and a mild learning disability. She had been in a relationship with GK for more than three
years when the proceedings commenced in 2015. The trigger for the proceedings was when others
became aware of her secretmarriage toGK.As a result of thismarriage, SC, LC’smother, informed
social services about the relationship because she was concerned that GKwas motivated to marry
LC to obtain a spousal visa to remain in the United Kingdom (UK).
A detailed judgmentwas handed downwhich, to date, has not been published. Two experts pro-
vided evidence on capacity to consent to sex. Dr T, a clinical psychologist, provided the original
capacity assessment for the application to the CoP. Dr Y, a forensic psychiatrist, was instructed
during CoP proceedings to provide an independent expert report on LC’s capacity. Dr T’s evi-
dence focused on LC’s understanding of STIs, explaining that she could name ‘AIDS’ but could
not understand that a person could have it without symptoms. Similarly, when Dr Y was ques-
tioned by Counsel for GK, she said that LC told her she ‘didn’t like condoms’ and was ‘on the
Depo injection’83 and that in her view LC ‘didn’t understand it didn’t stop sexual diseases’. When
further questioned about what LC did know about diseases, Dr Y said that she could name ‘AIDS’
but did not ‘understand what other diseases you could get’ and that she believed ‘as long as it
looked normal’ then there was no problem and no risk of disease. Importantly, evidence suggests
that many non-disabled adults are also more familiar with AIDS than other STIs given its higher
80 C. Tanton et al., ‘Patterns and Trends in Sources of Information about Sex among Young People in Britain: Evidence
from Three National Surveys of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles’ (2015) 5 BMJ Open 1, at 3.
81 Id., p. 4.
82 A. Hollomotz, Learning Difficulties and Sexual Vulnerability: A Social Approach (2011) 52.
83 Depo-Provera is one of a number of contraceptive injections provided towomen to protect against pregnancy. It is admin-
istered every 12 weeks and is believed to be at least 99 per cent effective if used correctly. See NHS, ‘The Contraceptive
Injection’ (2018) at <http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/contraception-guide/Pages/contraceptive-injection.aspx>.
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public profile.84 Dr Y was also asked what understanding LC had of pregnancy and explained
that she ‘understands by having sex you can get pregnant’. This focus on STIs and pregnancy was
despite the fact that LC had not, as far as the available evidence suggested, contracted an STI in
her four-year relationship, nor had she become pregnant.
In stark contrast, LC had clearly been in an abusive relationship. LC’s social workers explained
that she had expressed unhappiness with elements of her relationship with GK, particularly anal
sex, fromwhich she sustained an anal fissure, and a criminal investigation into the possibility that
GK had raped LC during their relationship was ongoing. GK was transported to and from prison
to attend the final hearing. Yet the CoP focused heavily on the medical aspects of the test rather
than the issues around consent.
The judge inLC’s case held that she lacked capacity to consent to sexual relations and thismeant
that she would be prohibited from having any intimate relationship. The judge explained that LC
‘does have sufficient understanding of the mechanics of the act’, but he appeared unconvinced
that she had capacity to understand pregnancy and risk of disease. The approach to capacity was
highly medicalized, with the court placing significant focus on scientific and expert opinion on
how the individual understood sex. However, there was very little focus on consent, despite it
clearly being the primary reason that the case was before the court. The judge briefly considered
LC’s ability to say no, marking an important recognition of the relevance of this aspect of the test:
69. The experts were of the view that she had no real understanding of her ability
to say no. This was particularly so within marriage. While she told her solicitor (in
response to information given by the representative) that she understood that ‘rape
can happenwithinmarriage’, she had previously told [Dr Y] that if a person ismarried
then they have to want to have sexual relations whenever their husband wants this,
and that if you were married and did not want sex then you had to split up.
70. . . . [Dr T] stated that [LC] would find it difficult to translate ‘no’ into reality. [Dr
Y] stated that [LC] ‘does not understand forced sex’.
Despite this recognition, there was only limited discussion of consent within the expert evidence
or presentation of the case.85 However, LC’s case was precisely the type of case where consent
should have been at the very core: it was entirely about sexual exploitation of a mentally disabled
woman by her partner.86
Applying a capabilities analysis, LC would have benefitted from the opportunity to develop her
capabilities in relation to health and intimacy, and to put that newly acquired knowledge and
understanding into practice before a capacity determination. Taken to its logical conclusion, the
capabilities approachwould have imposed a normativemoral duty on the state to provide herwith
the support and resources that she required to gain the appropriate level of understanding, rather
than allowing the state to prevent her from engaging in sexual intimacy as a result of her limited
84 J. Dalrymple et al., ‘Socio-Cultural Influences upon Knowledge of Sexually Transmitted Infections: A Qualitative Study
with Heterosexual Middle-Aged Adults in Scotland’ (2016) 24 Reproductive Health Matters 34, at 39.
85 There were two brief references by Counsel for GK and two very brief references to the issue from the Official Solicitor.
86 For a discussion of the meaning of vulnerability in this context and the need to move away from stigmatizing vulnera-
bility discourse, see V. E. Munro and J. Scoular, ‘Abusing Vulnerability? Contemporary Law and Policy Responses to Sex
Work in the UK’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 189; J. Lindsey, ‘Developing Vulnerability: A Situational Response to the
Abuse of Women with Mental Disabilities’ (2016) 24 Feminist Legal Studies 295.
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understanding of consent. The capabilities lens can therefore help us to understand how the indi-
vidual might be better supported to achieve capacity, rather than considering capacity a binary
yes/no question. It can also provide a more honest appraisal of the issues at the heart of the case.
Here, the case was primarily about abuse, rather than capacity. If LC had been in a fully consen-
sual relationship, we think it unlikely that this case would have reached the CoP, given her ability
to express an understanding of the first three elements of the test for capacity to consent to sexual
relations. Yet because English law allows intervention under the MCA to protect people who are
assessed as lacking capacity to make a decision, capacity has become the key legal mechanism for
intervening in intellectually disabled people’s lives. Troublingly, the approach taken by the CoP
identifies the cause of the abuse as the victim’s impairment (LC’s lack of capacity to describe the
medical risks of sex, or to understand the concept of forced sex), rather than as the actions of her
abuser. As consent becomes a more significant element of the capacity test in sexual relations in
light of JB, it is important that, as with all capacity law, we do not place higher burdens on disabled
people to rationalize their actions than on non-disabled people.
Our CoP empirical data also provides an insight into situations where sexual capacity is raised
in relation to potential perpetrators of abuse. Four of the 20 cases in our sample involved intel-
lectually disabled people who were considered at risk of perpetrating abuse: N County Council v.
CA, YS v. E District Council, OD v. R City Council and P CCG v. QB (see Table 1). Our analysis of
these cases suggests that an approach focused on consent would provide greater honesty about
the reason for intervention. Taking one case as an example, OD v. R City Council, we show how
capacity is used to regulate potential non-consensual sexual conduct.
OD concerned a 46-year-old male, OD, described as having mild learning disability and
schizophrenia. His case centred on a challenge to his deprivation of liberty (DOL) in a care home
brought by his relevant person’s representative. OD had been physically and sexually abused as a
child and at 19 he was convicted for the rape of his younger brother. He had further convictions
for gross indecency in a public place and indecent assault and indecent exposure. More recently,
it had been reported that OD had worked as a prostitute and had been financially exploited by
pimps. OD’s wishes and feelings were that he wished to live independently. He accepted that he
would need carers but wanted a lower level of supervision. The case file noted that, as a result of
his DOL, he was also in effect being treated as if he lacked capacity to consent to sex and to make
decisions about contact with others.
One of the authors attended court for the final hearing of this case, which was vacated at the
last minute as the parties had agreed a way forward based on the expert evidence. However, she
spoke with the judge and viewed the court records, including all of the evidence filed for the
hearing, such as witness statements and expert reports. The independent expert report of Dr L,
Consultant Psychiatrist, concluded that OD lacked capacity to make decisions about residence,
care, finances, contact, and litigation, but had capacity to make decisions about sex. This assess-
ment was reflected in the agreed final order. In light of the expert report, the local authority’s
position statement explained:
As P has capacity to engage in sexual relations, a further statement from the care
manager has been provided setting out the likely steps to be taken should P identify
a person with whom he would wish to have sex. As each person would need to be
considered afresh, no specific plan can be formulated, save for that a risk assessment
in respect of P’s contact with that person would have to be initially undertaken first.
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The medicalized approach to ‘risk management’ prevalent in psychiatric discourse87 was very
clear from both the expert report and the local authority’s response to it. During their meeting,
OD told Dr L that he did not like where he lived because of the ‘staff and residents, mainly the
staff’. He told Dr L that ‘they don’t treat me like a proper adult, they treat me like a kid’. OD also
told Dr L that he was gay and that ‘I used to sleep around and blokes . . . would pay me lots of
money for sex’. He said that he would like to have a relationship with a man at the care home but
could not because he did not know who was gay there. Concerns in this case were nothing to do
with whether or not OD understood pregnancy, the risks of disease, or the mechanics of sex. The
case was entirely about the risks of non-consensual sex and, ultimately, the findings of incapacity
in respect of residence, care and contact justified controls placed on OD.
The JB decision may well have changed the outcome in this case if the independent expert had
considered whether OD had capacity to engage in sex. We therefore acknowledge that this case
may be decided differently if it were to reach the CoP again, and in a way that is likely to be, prima
facie, more restrictive of a disabled person’s freedoms. However, our approach, and the Court of
Appeal’s reframing of the test, better captures the serious risks involved in not understanding the
mutual and consensual nature of sexual relations, rather than using contact or medical risks to
control the person indirectly. Further, while we agree that a focus on consent may, in some cases
such as this, lead to findings of incapacity to consent to sex, this approachmore accurately reflects
the reality of what is going on in practice in these CoP cases. It is better to be honest aboutwhat the
law is being instrumentalized for here, even if we then need to have a debate about whether or not
mental capacity law is the most appropriate vehicle for protecting others from the risk of abuse.88
Rather than a medicalized, risk-focused analysis, an approach that prioritizes understanding of
consent more honestly captures the essence of why we need a test for capacity in relation to sex
at all.
Overall, our approach would shift the focus in sexual capacity cases in two ways. First, and at
the very least, adopting a capabilities analysis justifies the provision of support to achieve capacity
before a case reaches a CoP determination. A capabilities approach provides a justice argument,
rather than a legal obligation, that underpins a resources claim for the provision of support to
improve a person’s understanding. Second, it refocuses the issues to include concerns about bodily
integrity and, therefore, consensual intimacy. The capabilities approach values supporting people
to protect their bodily health and integrity and underpins the provision of support for disabled
adults where they may ‘not yet’ have capacity to consent to sex.
6 CONCLUSION
Our empirical research in the CoP highlighted that, in many cases, the approach to sexual capac-
ity does not sufficiently focus on the central importance of consent in sexual relationships. The
interpretation and application of the legal test for capacity to consent to sex unduly medicalizes
the risks of sex and focuses on very narrow understandings of intimacy resulting in pregnancy
and STIs. This approach sidelines the social risks of sexual activity, specifically the risks that arise
fromnon-consensual sex as a result of not understanding that sexual intimacy is a choice, and one
87 J. Fanning, ‘Continuities of Risk in the Era of the Mental Capacity Act’ (2016) 24Medical Law Rev. 415; M. B. Simmons
and P. M. Gooding, ‘Spot the Difference: Shared Decision-Making and Supported Decision-Making in Mental Health’
(2017) 34 Irish J. of Psychological Medicine 275; Case, op. cit., n. 72.
88 For further discussion on this point, see Lindsey, op. cit., n. 44.
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to which either party can say no, despite this being a significant concern in the majority of sexual
relations cases that reach the CoP. Following the Court of Appeal decision in A Local Authority v.
JB, the consent element of sexual relations is likely to have a greater role in CoP decisions. How-
ever, our analysis of CoP cases in practice from 2016 has shown that where this issue comes up in
cases that are actually concerned with protection from abuse, the individual’s lack of capacity is
used as a justification for restricting her abilities to engage in any kinds of sexual activity, whether
or not consensual.
Taking a capabilities approach to these issues, as we have done, offers a more holistic under-
standing of sexual intimacy, grounding decisions about capacity to consent to sex in their full
range of individual and social contexts. The capabilities approach also offers a justification for
why resources should be provided to help individuals gain the relevant capabilities before deci-
sions are made about capacity. We recognize that developing a capability for intimacy requires
much more than understanding that sexual intimacy is a choice. We also accept that society may
have legitimate concerns about the spread of STIs or the cost of unintended pregnancies. How-
ever, protecting disabled people from sexual assault is a significant driver for these cases, given the
prevalence of allegations of abuse in sexual consent cases at the CoP. Focusing on pregnancy and
STIs therefore misses the point that the central practical function of the MCA in this context is to
protect against abuse. Protection of intellectually disabled people from sexual assault and abuse
can, we argue, be better achieved through supporting the individual to develop a capability for
consensual intimacy, which values bodily integrity and emotional development. We accept that,
in many CoP cases, the outcome on capacity may not be different if our approach were adopted.
However, an approach that emphasizes the importance of understanding consent focuses the law
on that issue, rather thanmedicalized risks of pregnancy and STIs, which in turn has an impact on
the nature of the support provided to enable the individual to develop the capability for intimacy.
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